The aim of this paper is to defend a type of pluralistic philosophical theory that addresses the specific characteristics of Latin American religious diversity. In order to do this, I will first try to show how, from a Latin American perspective, the discussion of religious diversity necessarily imposes the concept of syncretism and how this concept can be understood within the debate about diversity. After that, I will defend an understanding of religiosity that takes syncretism as something natural, given the functioning of our systems of practices and beliefs in general. Finally I will defend the advantages of a pluralistic philosophical perspective of religion that considers the phenomenon of syncretism and how it is necessary for an understanding of Latin American religiosity.
purist expression of religiosity. In this sense, syncretism is taken as an evil in itself that leads religiosities to lose their identities and relativize their beliefs.10 I understand, however, that syncretism is a constituent part of Latin American popular religiosity and, more than that, it is not an evil, but a normal phenomenon, and is constitutive of all faith or religious experience so must be taken into account in the formulation of a pluralistic philosophical theory. But before I defend the necessity for and peculiarities of such a theory it is necessary to clarify better the various uses of the word syncretism.
Leonardo Boff11 presents what, for him, are the various ways in which syncretism is understood. Among the modes listed by Boff are syncretism as addition, accommodation, mixing, agreement, translation, and recasting. The first understanding, addition, refers to cases when there is only one addition or alternation of beliefs, addition without interaction among the various beliefs. It is typical of some modes of dual belonging in which the believer adheres to, for example, both Umbanda and Catholicism, without any interaction between the two systems of beliefs and practices.
The second, accommodation, is the conception of syncretism used to explain the survival strategy of one religion in the face of domination by another. This is what happened, for instance, among African slaves in Brazil, who had to assimilate the beliefs and practices of colonial Catholicism into their original beliefs and practices.
The third mode is syncretism as a mixture. For Boff, syncretism implies mixing, and he uses the term mixture to refer to surface mixtures in which there is no unity or systematization but simply the conjunction of gods, practices, and rites. For him such syncretism is synonymous with dilution and confusion.
The fourth way in which the concept of syncretism is used is that of agreement, which consists in trying to create, according to the diversity of religions, a concordance of formulas, rites and expressions, to create a religion useful to all. The result, for Boff, is an attempt to bring about a religion montage, and syncretism would simply be juxtaposition.
The fifth use is that of religion as a translation. This is nothing more than when a particular religion uses the categories, cults, and traditions of other religions to communicate and translate their own beliefs. Boff understands this as a process common to all universal religions.
The sixth and last use is that of syncretism as a recasting. It is continuous to all religions and is a long and almost imperceptible process in which "religion opens itself to different religious expressions, assimilates them, reinterprets them, and recreates them from criteria of their own identity. It is not a question of merely assuming, but of recasting and converting, which sometimes implies crises, moments of undefinition and indeterminacy, not knowing whether identity was safeguarded or diluted "12. For Boff, this process is something that all systematized religions have undergone, and continue to undergo as they encounter new religious manifestations. This is the kind of syncretism that should be considered in studies of diversity, since it is a legitimate process of the life of all religions. Indeed Boff, in the face of the various uses of syncretism, seems to give more weight to recasting, since for him it is deeper and surpasses all other typologies.
Unlike Boff, Ferretti13 does not seek to define an ideal type of syncretism, but to set out four different categories or processes that may be called syncretism and that can occur in the same environment, in specific rituals. The four categories are: separation (non-syncretism), mixing, melting or hybridizing, parallels or juxtaposition, and convergence or adaptation.
For Ferretti, both in religion and in wider culture there are moments of separation or non-syncretism in which beliefs, practices and rituals are not convergent, and there is a certain strangeness between one and the other. An example of non-syncretism between the Catholic religion and some rituals of African origins is the animal sacrifice present in the latter but condemned in Catholicism. It is important to realize that separation is a moment in the whole; that is, the fact that there are certain distances in particular rites, 10 For a better understanding of the criticisms of the idea of syncretism see, for example: Soares, "Impasses da teologia Católica diante do sincretismo religioso afro-brasileiro". 11 Boff, "Igreja, Carisma e Poder". 12 Ibid., 149. 13 Ferretti, "Repensando o Sincretismo". practices, and beliefs does not imply that syncretism does not occur in other aspects of the system. In our view, this is an interesting position that we will return in the next section.
Mixing, melting or hybridism is when the use or mixing of identical rituals occurs in different religions. It is already clear that "the process of parallelism or juxtaposition can be exemplified in the relations between Orixás and Catholic Saints or with other entities"14 and is one of the most common processes of syncretism. In turn, the process of convergence or adaptation occurs when different manifestations have similar basic values and ideas and are therefore adapted to different systems.
The difference between Ferretti and Boff lies in the fact that the former does not use the category of recasting, which for the latter is essential, and also in the fact that Ferretti does not seem to judge the different types of syncretism or characterize them as better or worse. For him, all are legitimate phenomena of religious practices. In addition, Ferretti's thesis clearly states that the various processes of syncretism he lists can occur in one place, at different ritual moments. It is important, however, not to be misled by an idea that syncretism is purely ritual, since it also contains cultural element and influences the entire life of the religious believer.
Up to now, we have set out a panorama of Latin American syncretic religiosity and clarified some uses of syncretism. Now it is important to ask how the philosophy of religion would explain such syncretic diversity. Such a question becomes even more complex when we realize that the philosophy of religion has given much more space to explanation of the great universal religions, often taking them as pure and free of the concepts of other religions: its focus has been more a philosophy of theologies, to the detriment of a philosophy of religiosity. This perspective sometimes neglects the religion lived, that is, the religion practiced in people's daily lives and that truly influences the way they see and understand their world. However, in my view, it is in what I call popular religion that diversity really appears. In such a way, it is there that I can envisage a pluralist theory that explains the complexity and nuances of our plural societies, especially those of Latin America. Such a theory can help us to guide philosophies of theologies and theologies themselves15. Is it possible, though, to conceive a pluralist theory that takes into account the syncretic variety of Latin American popular religiosity?
Pluralism with syncretism
The vast philosophical production concerning the diversity of religious beliefs is generally divided into three broad approaches, namely exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. Despite the argumentative richness of the theories that advocate exclusivism and inclusivism, I understand that they do not take even religious diversity seriously, let alone the possibility of religious syncretism. While the first theory seems to presuppose the idea of the possibility of a pure religion, without interference from culture and other religions16, the second works merely with a notion of inclusion of the stranger, without realizing that contact with other religions can modify the belief system itself where it intended merely to include others17. In light of this, I defend a pluralistic philosophical position which, in my view, is a more plausible response to diversity because it does not deny its legitimacy and makes possible coexistence between the different existing religions, and, besides that, if properly understood, gives space for the understanding of the phenomenon of syncretism, especially the syncretism of Latin American religiosity.
Among the common ways of defending pluralism in the face of religious diversity is pluralism which understands religions as systems of beliefs and practices that are unrelated to one another and which have developed autonomously, thus can only be understood internally to these systems18. On the other hand, a second way of viewing diversity from a pluralistic perspective is to assume something common to all religious systems, highlighting the unity of all these systems, despite their variety19. As I have already shown elsewhere,20 the problem both these ways conceiving diversity is insufficient to address issues such as interreligious dialogue and the phenomenon of syncretism. In this sense, I understand that a pluralist theory needs to be developed in such a way that syncretism is considered a valid phenomenon. In Language, Belief and Plurality: a Contribution to Understanding Religious Diversity, I developed a pluralistic Wittgensteinian approach, which, in my view, can explain religious diversity in general and especially the Latin American religious syncretism.
Basically, I claimed that religious diversity is a natural result of the fact that we are linguistic beings who develop our beliefs and practices in specific contexts, and often these contexts are not shared. The various religions are, in this sense, complex linguistic systems that have a set of beliefs and practices which directly influence the lives of believers21. The belief systems do not necessarily share something in common (like an essence) to all systems and can differentiate themselves from each other22. I also demonstrated, however, that from the fact that different belief systems exist and do not have something common to them all, it does not necessarily follow that mutual understanding among the different systems is impossible. We can develop a belief system in an isolated context, but that does not mean that it is impossible for someone outside that context to understand the system;23 that is, the belief systems are not private belief systems. When they are expressed, the beliefs of the system become public, accessible to every human being who is willing to understand them24. In short, what I am saying is that even radically different systems can maintain some kind of relationship. That is, even in saying that a system is really different from mine, I need to understand, at least in part, what within such a system is different from mine. To do this, I do not need a meta-system, but merely to be open to seeing differences, and seeing differences is also a special kind of understanding.
In practical life, in ordinary language and in folk religion, there is an exchange of knowledge and practices. The different belief systems are not completely disconnected and isolated from each other; there is not an incommensurable gap between them. In fact, we will only know the real differences between our different belief systems when we exchange knowledge with other religious groups. Of course, this exchange of knowledge is not something simple: it demands seeing the different system with other eyes, perceiving differences, and not applying our world-picture to the understanding of another. Coming to appreciate these different ways of seeing the world will affect our own world-picture because it is changeable, malleable, like a riverbed. Despite the differences between alternative systems, it is possible for one system to enrich another.
It is in this sense that I understand that syncretism can be considered as a natural phenomenon common to all religions. That is, the different religions are not closed systems that are never related, but systems that 18 I consider one example of this type of theory, Harrison's internalist pluralism from, "Internal Realism and the Problem of Religious Diversity". 19 Such a perspective, I believe, is adopted for example by Hick in "An Interpretation of Religion". 20 See Spica, "Language, Belief and Plurality". 21 This is not a definition of religion in the sense that such features define what we call religion and only what we call religion. There are other human practices that can also be characterized as complex linguistic systems with practices and beliefs. I do not have time here to discuss the question of the definition of the term religion.
22 My point was demonstrate that Hick's position is a mistake. Hick assumes a strong ontological thesis that all religions are the result of human encounters with the Real and that they are pursuing the same general goals. My approach, on the other hand, does not define religion or say that there is something common to all religions, but defends the legitimacy of different religious experiences and the impossibility of determining a characteristic common to all these systems. 23 That, in my view, is the difference between my approach and Harrison's approach. 24 Of course I do not rule out that there may be partial failures in understanding these systems, but the important thing here is to show that it is possible to understand the systems of others. meet one another, that are capable of modifying each other25. But these encounters are not necessarily mediated by the idea that a system A is better or worse than a system B, that a system A is alternative to system B. That is, the religion A did not emerge as a reaction to a religion B because the religion A was not true. So, it cannot be assumed that a believer chooses the religious system A because she considers it more appropriate, true or reliable than a system B. In most cases, the believer begins a religious practice without knowing the alternatives, and religious beliefs are involved in her ways of thinking in such a way that the believer is not explicit about their adoption. This same believer, over the course of her life, encounters other systems of beliefs, and faced with these different systems may have highly diverse reactions, but among the possible reactions is the prospect of opening up to new experiences, knowing some of the other beliefs, and seeing new possibilities. To do this, the believer does not necessarily have to put aside her old religion. What can happen is precisely a syncretic process, a transformation of one's own belief system, which at the same time can cause a modification to the systems of others. This transformation is not necessarily an external one, in the sense of imposing practices, concepts, rites, and beliefs on different systems, and need not necessarily be a conversion. It can be simply an inner transformation. Soares claim that:
Every religion transforms itself from within, in contact with others; it is necessary to let religion become the rhythm of the crises, discoveries and exchanges that it accomplishes with the others. In this process people do not need to apostatize or leave their original religions. A religious community lets itself be touched by another faith or belief system, assimilating what seems to make more sense and discarding what it is not convenient.26
In my view, Soares is right to defend the possibility of internal transformations of religions. Since, as I said earlier, our belief systems are malleable, that is, they are not fixed, unchanging systems. What happens is that we have certain beliefs within these systems that are hardly questioned, but the system as a whole is always under construction. Wittgenstein, for instance, argues that knowledge only makes sense within the context of belief systems that form world-pictures. These world-pictures, in turn, are the bases arguments rest on; not in the sense of presupposition, as if first the person became conscious of world-pictures and only then could start to make hypotheses or know something, but in the sense that the arguments are involved in a world-picture that does not always appear.27 All singular beliefs are given within a system of sentences. To Wittgenstein one feature of a world-picture is that it is changeable, flexible:
The child learns to believe a host of things. I. e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift.28 25 In saying this I am not claiming that religious change cannot be done without syncretism or even as a move against it. What I am saying is that one cannot deny the fact that changes within religions can happen because of syncretism and that Latin American religiosity is the proof of this. Of course, changes without and against syncretism happen and the Reformation movement in Christianity in the 16th century is a good example of that: The Reformers criticized the fact that the Christian message had been lost from its original purity, and this was the reason for reforming the church. It is interesting that this idea of a certain purity of the religion proper to the Reformation seems to be present in authors of the Reformed Epistemology, such as Plantinga, but we not have time to explore this question in this article. However, as already said, this perspective does not seem to be present in the religious experience of many people in Latin America, and especially in Brazil. As we have seen, syncretism is common even in some sectors of Latin American Catholicism. This is perhaps due to the mode of action of Catholicism during the colonial period. In Brazil, for example, some historicists note that the official church had difficulty making itself present in all Brazilian communities. There were not enough priests to minister to all communities, and so the official church and its doctrines were far from religious life. Catholics then lived their Christian belief and adapted it to a new reality without the direct interference of Rome in many cases (See, for example: Hoornaert, "Formação do catolicismo brasileiro"; Smith, "Brazil, people and institutions"; Macedo, "Religiosidade popular brasileira colonial"). 26 Soares, "O Sincretismo à Luz de uma Teologia Interconfessional ", 241. 27 It is important to be clear that Wittgenstein is using the word Weltbild (world-picture) and not Weltanschauung (worldview). The Weltbild is tacit and implicit, while the Weltanschauung is conscious and explicit. To better understand see Wittgenstein, "On Certainty", § § 93-95; 162-67; 233-34. See also Hamilton, "Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty". 28 Wittgenstein, "On Certainty", § 144.
As well as the fact that practices and human language are constantly changing, the beliefs that compose our world-picture also change. Our world-picture is like a river bed and the waters that pass through the river (everyday beliefs, assumptions, knowledge, new knowledge) can modify the bed. More importantly, even some sentences that form the riverbed (our world-picture) can be modified and transformed into empirical judgments, that is, become verifiable. In this sense, our world picture emerges in our everyday language practice and is modified by it. But it is important to realize that some beliefs and sentences in our world-picture are not easily changeable. As Wittgenstein said: "And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited"29. Although our image of the world is changeable, there are certain hard rock beliefs that are not subject to change without our entire belief system being cast aside. In a sense, what Wittgenstein is stressing is that our world-picture is not fixed, it moves, just like the riverbed, but even with the changes that occur in some of our basic beliefs it is possible to distinguish between the river and the riverbed. The change is not abrupt.30 In my view, the same happens with religions. They are complex systems that change over time and that, given contact with other religions and cultures, can transform themselves. To understand religions in a fixed and finished way is to consider them outside human reality, free from all social and cultural interference. However, in saying that they change, I am not saying that these modifications need to be abrupt or rapid, in fact, they are often slow and continuous.
Why, then, should an approach to religious diversity in the sense I am proposing be useful for understanding Latin American religious syncretism? In the first place, it does not take syncretism as something anomalous, but natural. By saying that our belief systems are malleable and that they change with new experiences and contacts with new ways of seeing and thinking about the world, we are creating space to accept that different systems may have similarities or at least talk to each other. We are opening space to search for an understanding of why it is possible to think that believers of different systems can participate in both systems without finding contradiction in this double belonging. Given that the belief systems of all people, including religious people, are capable of malleability, it is fully possible to think of the possibility of dual belonging, an ability to live together and even make use of different belief systems in the everyday of religious life. And, in my view, seeking to understand, rather than condemning phenomena such as these as an improper way of living faith, is a far more fruitful attitude for the philosophy of religion, theology, and the sciences of religion in general.
Secondly, such a perspective opens space for us to speak of varied syncretisms; that is, there is no correct mode of syncretism. Faced with new belief systems, we do not always reflect on them to then take parts or the whole new system as part of our entire belief system. Often, this new system imposes itself on us as part of the whole of our life, and, by the time we realize it, we are already living through new experiences, with new practices, cults and beliefs, that we had not imagined before. In this sense, there are several possibilities in the face of new religious systems, and syncretism can take on several facets, from the mere adoption of some rites to a re-founding of the systems that exist. Thus, a characterization of syncretism like the one given by Ferretti seems to me to be adequate. As we have seen, for him syncretism is dynamic, and faced with a new system, the believer can assume certain things while rejecting others. On the contrary, o assume that one kind of syncretism is more valuable than the others, is already to assume a must-being of syncretism, which often does not correspond to the reality in the religious daily life of the believer of the encounter between different religions.
Thirdly and most importantly, the importance of my approach is its concern more with the religious way of thinking than with theories-in this sense we are looking at the daily dealings of the religious, not theology. Syncretism cannot then be seen as a theological, academic activity, imposed on other belief 29 Ibid., § 99. 30 Wittgenstein has illustrated this as follows: "It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the riverbed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other" (Wittgenstein, "On Certainty", § 96-97). For a more detailed development see, for example, Moyal-Sharrock, "Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty".
systems, but as a natural process for the religious believer's way of thinking. It is not an artificial product, imposed by a philosophy or theology external to the way of living and thinking of the religious believer, but proper to the possibilities of believers' beliefs and practices31. In this sense, just as Wittgenstein in On Certainty is not concerned with discovering things we can think of, but what is involved in our ways of thinking32, my approach only spells out the possibilities of religious thinking, and among these possibilities is undoubtedly the possibility of syncretism. Thus, it seems that a truly pluralist theory that claims to play the role of valuing the different religions must necessarily consider syncretism as a non-anomalous phenomenon to religious diversity, especially in Latin America.
But, of course, this approach can face some criticisms. The first is concerns precisely religious identity. That is, it could be argued that treating religions as dynamic systems that change over time may lead to a state of affairs where it is impossible to characterize what constitutes a particular religiosity, where, it can be difficult to identify the characteristics that make one religiosity different from another. I would reject this with regard to my approach: to say that religious systems are not fixed but dynamic and that they are capable of maintaining contact and even realizing syncretism between them is not to say that there is nothing that identifies one religious system in comparison with others. What I am saying is that the characteristics of a certain religiosity are constantly being built. Again, to take religions as something ready is to take them out of human life, to take them out of the culture that is always changing. To say that a religion is constituted in isolation is not to realize that, although it may be the fruit of a relationship with that which transcends human life, it is still a human construction, a human understanding of the transcendent. In addition, the very identity of human groups is in constant change, even if it is sometimes imperceptible. Of course, core issues remain in place for a long time and this may be constituent of the identity of religions. More importantly, I am not saying that a system A should change because a system B so desires it, but that it is possible for systems to change internally through contact with other systems. Thus, identity continues to be an internal construction of each religiosity.
Another charge that my approach might suffer is that of relativism. That is, the idea that since I open space for syncretism and various ways of living religiosity, I also open space for anything goes, or for the idea that there are no truths. I would like to respond to this possible criticism considering two different aspects of the charge. In the first place, to speak of syncretism is to speak of a process that occurs gradually, through encounters with different systems. As we have seen, when one religiosity allows itself to be touched by another, it assimilates what suits it, but it also rules out what does not suit it. The limitation of syncretism is given internally to systems; that is, it is internal to them, in their praxis, that syncretism finds limits. In this sense, to say that there is no pure faith, no autochthonous religious systems that are never allowed to be touched by others, is not to say that everything is valid and that all religions should accept all the specificities of all other religions. So then, what should and should not be accepted? It will be up to believers and religious systems to decide, given the dynamics of each religiosity.
Given this, it is easy to understand the second point of response to the possible charge of relativism. The religious approach I am advocating does not eliminate the possibility of speaking in terms of truth. Syncretism does not eliminate disagreement. That is, there will always be disagreement between different religions, even if the syncretic process occurs between them. That is, even if two religions approach each other in many respects, and the religious believer performs syncretisms between them, it is possible and very likely that points of disagreement will still be maintained. What is important here is to realize that disagreements are punctual. That is, there are not necessarily disagreements in the sense that the entire other system is wrong. As we have seen, this is not how belief systems work. People often question beliefs about a particular system, not the system as a whole.
31 When we realize this, we find a good answer to those who say that the pluralistic view in the problem of religious diversity sounds as a typical philosophical view, for the religious believer is not a pluralist normally, but an exclusivist. The fact of syncretism and double belongings of Latin American religiosity is a good example of what it is possible to see pluralism in religious practice and that the pluralistic view is not just a typical philosophical view. With this, we do not want to say that there are no exclusivist perspectives in Latin American religiosity. But in this article, what we are emphasizing is precisely the ability of some believers to be pluralistic and deal with syncretism and double belonging. 32 See, Phillips, "Faith after foundationalism", 54-55.
As far as the question of truth is concerned, the maximum that could be said here is that no religious system can claim to be the holder of absolute truth. In my view, the question of truth and/or falsehood is inherent in religious systems and the history of religions shows that much of what is considered true, internally to a religious system in a given historical period, is held to be false in other periods, and this is the fruit or the development of the system or the fact of its believers exchanging ideas with other belief systems. In this sense, perhaps the best way is to accept Roger Trigg's33 proposal, which states that as human beings, we need to recognize that we have a less than full understanding of what truth is, without saying that the truth is impossible or that anything goes. Such an idea may favor the fact that participants in different belief systems can listen to each other and avoid absolutism, since no belief system owns the absolute truth and therefore does not have to coerce others to accept its particular truth. For Trigg the fundamental question in the interreligious relationship is not whether there is an established truth that others must accept, but a position of humility that asks how we can be sure of what truth is.
Conclusion
My goal in this work was to contribute to the philosophical debate about religious diversity, more specifically Latin American religiosity. The motivation to do this was the fact that I view traditional philosophical theories of religious diversity as being insufficient to explain the complexity of Latin American religiosity, a religiosity that has been built and continues to be built through intense syncretism.
It seems clear that the philosophy of religion needs to take the phenomenon of syncretism seriously, especially when it addresses issues of religious diversity, rather than viewing it as "wrong". In this sense, perhaps, a pluralistic philosophy of religion should not allow itself to be just a comparative philosophy of religions, since it is not enough to compare concepts and see what could be accommodated in each system. Such a perspective may be insufficient to understand phenomena such as multiple affiliations and religious transit in a globalized world in which we are increasingly aware of different belief systems. On the other hand, a pluralistic philosophy of religion that takes into account syncretism will take as worthy of study the fact that there are people who consciously accept different spiritual options, often leading to non-equivalent commitments. Facing this phenomenon, for example, the philosophy of religion would have to ask itself how this is possible, opening new fields of dialogue, for example, with the sciences of religions, psychology, anthropology, and sociology, among others, to seek to understand the complexity of syncretism and of multiple affiliations.
In my view, taking Latin American syncretism seriously may not only help to better understand the religiosity that is practiced here, but it can also lead to a new understanding of how to conduct philosophy of religion in a world where diversity cannot be understood either as a large number of systems that are varied only accidentally, nor as systems completely unrelated to one other. In this sense, I think it is urgent to defend a pluralist theory of religions that takes into account the possibility of syncretism. This is not to preach extreme relativism or saying that truth does not matter. It is simply to say that human belief systems and practices are constantly being built and that this can lead to syncretisms of the most diverse. Such syncretisms, rather than being negative, are positive paths towards a fuller understanding of the world and the place of humanity within it. And they deserve, first of all, the special attention of philosophy when it is concerned with studying religious diversity.
